The Afghan Taliban statement on March 5, rejecting peace talks with the Afghan government, didn’t come as a surprise because the militant group had already listed four pre-conditions for creating the right atmosphere for any further negotiations to take place.
At the ‘Peace and Security Conference’ organised by an international NGO, Pugwash, in Doha, Qatar, on January 23-24 this year, the Taliban representatives had made it clear they won’t participate in peace talks until the removal of their members’ names from the United Nations Security Council blacklist, release of their prisoners from the United States-run Guantanamo Bay prison and other jails, establishment of a formal office of the Taliban-led Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, preferably in Qatar, and an end to what they called a “poisonous” propaganda against the Taliban by the Afghan government.
As there was no progress on any of these demands, it was felt that the Taliban may not join the peace process being brokered by the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) with representatives from Afghanistan, Pakistan, China and the US. Still, the QCG had expressed hope that the peace talks would resume in the first week of this month in the Pakistan capital of Islamabad. The optimism was misplaced even though it had held four meetings in Islamabad and Kabul over the previous two months, preparing a roadmap for reviving the peace talks and quietly sounding out the Taliban about it.
The Taliban refusal to participate in the peace talks was certainly a setback for the QCJ, but it hasn’t give up yet. All four countries represented in the QCJ are making efforts to persuade the Taliban to agree to the peace talks. Twice recently, Afghan President Ashraf Gani extended his invitation to the Taliban for the peace talks. Dr Abdullah Abdullah, the chief executive officer in the unity government with Gani, also offered peace talks to the Taliban. Such an invitation was needed because the Taliban leadership had been arguing that the unity government wasn’t united enough on the issue of talking to the Taliban.
China has maintained contacts with the Taliban leadership even after the collapse of the Taliban regime as a result of the US invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001. There were credible reports that Chinese diplomats got in touch with Taliban officials in Qatar to convince them to give peace a chance by attending the QCG-sponsored talks.
On its part, the US renewed its appeal to the Taliban to join the peace talks and backed it up with a mild warning that Afghan and American forces would have to prepare themselves for the prospect of increased violence in the spring and summer when the weather warms up and the so-called fighting season in Afghanistan begins. The US State Department statement showed that America was willing and hoping that the Taliban would opt for the option of peace instead of war to bring the Afghan conflict to an end.
However, the focus of attention has been Pakistan’s role in contributing to the peace process in neighbouring Afghanistan. Aware of the sometimes unwanted attention and criticism it was facing, Pakistan doubled its efforts to bring the Taliban to the negotiation table as much was expected of it to make this happen due to its traditionally close ties with the armed group. The recent unannounced visits by the Pakistan Army Chief General Raheel Sharif to Qatar and Afghanistan were apparently desperate attempts by him to persuade the Taliban leaders based in Doha, through the Qatar government, to participate in the talks and also to seek Gani’s cooperation in offering some incentives to the Taliban.
The extent of Pakistan’s influence on the Taliban has always been a matter of debate and it became obvious that there were limits to its leverage when the Taliban rejected peace talks with Kabul in spite of Islamabad’s persuasion. Sartaj Aziz, Adviser on Foreign Affairs to Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, had, during an earlier visit to the US, tried to define the parameters of Pakistan’s influence by conceding for the first time that the Afghan Taliban leadership was based in Pakistan and that the injured Taliban sought treatment in the country. He argued that this allowed Pakistan to exert some influence on the Taliban and try to help in moving forward the peace and reconciliation process in Afghanistan.
If this doesn’t work, Islamabad would come under increased pressure from Kabul and Washington to take action against the irreconcilable Taliban leaders based in Pakistan. Until now, Pakistan has refrained from arm-twisting the Taliban leadership. In fact, it has been arguing that persuasion, instead of the use of force, should be tried to bring the Taliban to the negotiations table.
With Nawroz, celebrated as the New Year in Afghanistan, Iran and Central Asian countries on March 21, fast approaching — when the Taliban normally announces the start of the yearly spring offensive — there is a sense of urgency to revive the peace talks and prevent further bloodshed. Though the Taliban attacks continued with an unusual intensity even during this winter, the warming of the weather in most parts of Afghanistan traditionally leads to more fighting. There have been predictions that the fighting this summer would be the bloodiest till date as the Taliban believes that the Afghan security forces have become particularly vulnerable, following the drawdown of the bulk of US-led Nato forces and due to an end to most combat operations by the residual, almost 10,000 US troops in Afghanistan. It is indeed true that the Taliban has split into two factions, after the revelation last July of the death of their supreme leader Mulla Mohammad Omar, but the fact remains that the mainstream group headed by Mulla Akhtar Mohammad Mansour holds the key to ending the conflict, as it is far more powerful than the rival Mulla Mohammad Rasool faction. The Mansour faction rejected the peace talks and the process would be back on tract only if the ongoing efforts to persuade it to talk to Kabul make any headway.
Rahimullah Yusufzai is a Gulf News correspondent based in Pakistan. He is the Resident Editor of the News International in Peshawar and a senior political and security analyst for Pakistan’s largest television network, Geo TV. He was the first to interview Taliban founder Mullah Mohammad Omar, and had twice interviewed Osama Bin Laden in 1998.
