In 1941, Time editor Henry Luce proclaimed “the American century”. Some now see this coming to an end as a result of the nation’s economic and political decline. Many point to the example of US failure to convince its allies to stay out of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Beijing’s rival to the World Bank; but this was more of an example of a faulty decision than evidence of decline, which raises the question of what is the natural life cycle of a nation.
A century is generally the limit for a human organism, but countries are social constructs. Rome did not collapse until more than three centuries after it reached its apogee of power in 117AD. After American independence in 1776, Horace Walpole, the British politician, lamented that his nation had been reduced to the level of Sardinia, just as Britain was about to enter the industrial revolution that powered its second century as a global power.
Any effort at assessing American power in the coming decades should take into account how many earlier efforts had been wide of the mark. It is chastening to remember how wildly exaggerated US estimates of Soviet power in the 1970s and of Japanese power in the 1980s were. Today, some see the Chinese as 10 feet tall and proclaim this “the Chinese century”.
China’s size and relatively rapid economic growth will bring it closer to the US in terms of its power resources in the next few decades. But this does not necessarily mean it will surpass the US in military, economic and soft power.
Even if China suffers no big domestic political setback, many projections are simple linear extrapolations of growth rates that are likely to slow in the future. Moreover, economic projections are one dimensional. They ignore US military and soft power advantages, such as the desire of students around the world to attend US universities. They also overlook China’s geopolitical disadvantages in the Asian balance of power, compared with America’s relations with Europe, Japan and India, which are likely to remain more favourable.
It is not impossible that a challenger such as China, Europe, Russia, India or Brazil will surpass the US in the first half of this century, but it is not likely.
On the question of absolute rather than relative American decline, the US faces serious problems in areas such as debt, secondary education, income inequality and political gridlock, but these are only part of the picture. On the positive side of the ledger are favourable trends in demography, technology and energy as well as abiding factors such as geography and entrepreneurial culture.
The scenarios that could precipitate decline include ones in which the US overreacts to terrorist attacks by turning inwards and thus cuts itself off from the strength it obtains from openness. Alternatively, it could react by overcommitting itself and wasting blood and treasure as it did in Vietnam and Iraq.
As an overall assessment, describing the 21st century as one of American decline is inaccurate and misleading. Though the US has problems it is not in absolute decline, unlike ancient Rome, and it is likely to remain more powerful than any single state in coming decades.
The real problem is not that it will be overtaken by China or another contender, but rather that it faces a rise in the power resources of many others — both states and non-state actors such as transnational corporations, terrorist groups and cyber criminals. And it will face an increasing number of global problems that will call on our ability to organise alliances and networks.
Contrary to the views of those who proclaim that this is the Chinese century, we have not entered a post-American world. But the American century of the future will not look the same as in previous decades. The US share of the world economy will be smaller than it was in the middle of the past century.
Furthermore, the complexity created by the rise of other countries, as well as the increased role of non-state actors, will make it harder for even America, the biggest power, to wield influence and organise action. Entropy is a greater challenge than China.
At the same time, even when the US had its greatest preponderance of power resources, it often failed to secure what it wanted. Those who argue that the disorder of today’s world is much worse than in the past should remember a year such as 1956, when the US was unable to prevent Soviet repression of a revolt in Hungary; or the Suez invasion by America’s allies Britain, France and Israel. We must not view the past through rose-tinted glasses. Now, with slightly less preponderance and a much more complex world, the American century will continue for at least a few decades, but it will look very different from when Luce first articulated it.
— Financial Times
The writer is a professor at Harvard and author of Is the American Century Over?
