After a pre-speech rollout campaign that surpassed any of President Barack Obama’s other foreign policy initiatives in recent years, we finally arrived at Obama’s speech ostensibly outlining a strategy against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Isil). Apparently there will be a lot of degrading and destroying.
Rather than summarise the key points of the speech or stress its key takeaways, let’s talk about what was not in the speech. I watched Obama’s address with a set of questions that I was hoping the president would tackle. He didn’t, so let’s ask them here:
1) Exactly how big a threat is Isil to the United States? Public opinion polls suggest that Americans are freaking out a bit about Isil, as it is known. But in statement after statement, US intelligence and counterterrorism officials acknowledge that Isil lacks the capability to hit at the United States. So why the big hubbub?
Obama’s explanation:
[begin ital]
Isil poses a threat to the people of Iraq and Syria and the broader Middle East, including American citizens, personnel and facilities. If left unchecked, these terrorists could pose a growing threat beyond that region, including to the United States. While we have not yet detected specific plotting against our homeland, Isil leaders have threatened America and our allies.[end ital]
Eh, that’s still not enough. There are lots of actors out there who threaten the US without specific plots. What makes isil so worrisome? Why a primetime speech to address Isil, but not, say, Al Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula?
To be clear, I think there’s a possible answer to that question. It’s just that Obama hasn’t provide it yet.
2) Which allies will assist in degrading and destroying Isil? The president asserted that, “America will be joined by a broad coalition of partners.” The only partner he mentioned by name was the Iraqi government. So who else will be contributing support? Saudi Arabia? Turkey? What about Qatar? Any Nato allies? Specificity matters here. Which countries in the region are prepared to commit real resources to fighting the Islamic States?
3) How will the Isil campaign play out in Syria? The Iraq portion of Obama’s speech made enough sense, even though he might have been wishcasting the virtues of the post-Nouri Al Maliki government. But the strategy in Syria is way more opaque. According to Obama:
[begin ital]
Across the border in Syria, we have ramped up our military assistance to the Syrian opposition. Tonight, I again call on Congress, again, to give us additional authorities and resources to train and equip these fighters. In the fight against Isil, we cannot rely on a [Bashar Al] Assad regime that terrorises its own people — a regime that will never regain the legitimacy it has lost. Instead, we must strengthen the opposition as the best counterweight to extremists like Isil, while pursuing the political solution necessary to solve Syria’s crisis once and for all.[end ital]
But as Obama has repeatedly averred, he doesn’t put much faith in the Free Syria Army. So how exactly will “ramping up” play out? Will other forces be involved? What if the newly armed opposition decided to take the fight to Al Assad first? What if Al Assad exploits fighting between Isil and the Free Syrian Army? How will we respond?
4) How will the campaign against Islamic State intersect with other US interests in the region? The administration is also committed to ejecting Al Assad’s government from Syria and negotiating a nuclear deal with Iran. Where does combating Isil fall in the hierarchy of US preferences? It’s true that, for the moment, a variegated set of interests are united in defeating Isil. But that can change. What are the tradeoffs between defeating Isil and cutting a deal with Iran?
— Washington Post
Daniel W. Drezner is a professor of international politics at Tufts University and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.
