Beirut: A recent cartoon in the pan-Arab daily Al Hayat had a mullah riding a detached Yemen from the Arabian Peninsula as if it were a water speed-board dashing towards Iran.

Similar images of what Tehran contemplated for Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, all drawn with impeccable skills, heralded Arab intelligentsia perceptions that Iranian officials were embarked on little more than hegemonic behaviour. Weighed against the rhetoric emanating from Tehran, it was fair to ask whether cartoonish explanations that placed Iran on the power pedestal were warranted, or whether they contained any truths that heightened fears that Iran hijacked Arab aspirations.

From his hospital bed a few days ago, the Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei mocked President Barack Obama and the latter’s strategy to defeat Daesh, even as President Hassan Rouhani gave his qualified support to Western military operations in Iraq and in fact, critised the US decision not to send ground troops to fight Daesh in Iraq. This was confusing, of course, though hardly surprising.

In fact, and nearly four decades into its revolution, Iran struggled with epochal ideological crises that necessitated suppression and classic propaganda initiatives. As recently as 2009, the regime of the Mullahs felt no compunction to gun down dozens and arresting thousands.

Revolutionary Guard members attached to the Quds Force under the command of Major General Qasem Sulaimani until August 2014 (and who was replaced by Hussain Hamadani a few weeks ago after the former was seen directing ground forces in Iraqi Kurdistan), were active in Syria and Lebanon too. Direct as well as indirect operations through its Hezbollah proxies were identifiable in several countries, ranging from Argentina to Thailand.

Of course, open support to Al Houthi rebels in Yemen divided that hapless country as well, and which was now destined to confront internal challenges for years if not decades to come. In every instance, one could easily identify Iranian hands destined to advance revolutionary goals, sustained by financial and military aid. Still, by spreading their ambitions so wide, Iranian officials ran the risk of espousing contradictory policies, which surfaced a few days ago between the Supreme Guide and the President.

Indeed, while Ayatollah Khamenei claimed that US Secretary of State John Kerry pleaded with Iran to join the coalition against Daesh, his own president told a slightly different story.

Khameini affirmed that he laughed at the Obama administration’s comments vis-à-vis Daesh from his hospital bed. According to the cleric, Tehran informed Washington that it would not assist the United States in its fight against the terrorist organisation.

Khamenei further claimed that Wendy Sherman, the undersecretary for political affairs and lead negotiator with Iran over its nuclear programme, as well as the US Ambassador to Iraq, Stuart Jones, allegedly asked Iranian officials if they would kindly join the coalition.

“I opposed” such requests, asserted Khamenei, and ruled out Iranian cooperation with the “Americans in this regard since they have a corrupt intention and stained hands.” It was particularly unbecoming to hear the cleric identify undersecretary Sherman’s alleged request during the talks with her Iranian counterpart Saeed Abbas Araqchi, which mixed apples and oranges, because discussions between Iran and the permanent members of the UN Security Council (plus Germany) were at a super critical stage and could easily fail.

Moreover, while the US Department of State did not rule out a potential role for Iran in future negotiations, its official policy was to deny Iran specific responsibilities in the fight against Daesh because of serious questions on the group’s origins and sponsors.

In the event, Khamenei accused the United States of “telling a lie” about its purported role in ongoing developments, though the core dispute was over the coalition’s actions in Syria, a strategic Iranian prize. This became crystal clear in New York where President Rouhani unhesitatingly drew a sharp distinction between Syria and Iraq. Rouhani, who attended the annual UN General Assembly, berated attackers but separated those who responded to Iraq’s calls for assistance — thereby distinguishing his own country’s initiatives to save Arbil and prevent Baghdad from falling to Daesh — with those who engaged Daesh targets in Syria.

His colourful language aside, Rouhani’s remarks sounded a lot more accommodating, which were telling. When asked how the interventions in Iraq and Syria differed, Rouhani affirmed that whenever a “sovereign government” gave its consent for military aid, Iran could only back such a position.

Baghdad requested assistance, he declared, whereas Damascus did not. The astute Rouhani did not refer to Syrian officials’ repeated demands that they would hardly object to coalition aerial attacks against Daesh if leading powers simply informed them first. It was unclear whether any contacts were made though one assumed that warnings were issued because not a single Syrian air defence system was activated to prevent the most recent attacks on Daesh targets in or near the city of Raqqa and elsewhere.

In fact, official Syrian newspapers carried headlines that hinted Damascus was fully engaged in the fight against Daesh … alongside coalition members.

While Iranian and Hezbollah mouthpieces spewed their customary anti-Western venom, innate rhetorical contradictions surfaced, which reflected poor coordination among senior leaders. Such confusion highlighted overextension and, naturally, an indication of critical misunderstandings that did not augur well for the revolutionary regime.