Indian Arabists who staunchly support the Palestinian cause and have watched the forging of ties between India and Israel with growing alarm, can no longer pretend that the new relationship that India is seeking to cement with the U.S.' only real ally in the Middle East does not exist.

After years of only admitting to the purchase of hi-tech arms and weaponry and intelligence to counter the uprising in Kashmir, it is today a much closer strategic embrace.

The clearest signal yet that India's foreign policy mandarins have shed yet another shibboleth came with its National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra's speech at the American Jewish Community annual dinner earlier this month. This was only reinforced by the announcement of the visit to India by the much reviled Israeli premier Ariel Sharon on June 10.

Earlier indicators that India was exploring the parameters of the relationship came with visits to Israel by former foreign minister Jaswant Singh – whom many credit with creating movement on the architecture of a U.S.-India alliance – and later that of the real power figure in the Indian administration, the country's canny home minister Lal Krishna Advani.

Former envoy to Pakistan G. Parthasarthy last week revealed links with the Israelis that go back to the Sino-Indian war of 1962, and during the Indo-Pakistan conflict in 1965.

The move therefore to openly reach out now to Israel after years of keeping such links under wraps can only be likened to India's dramatic change of tack on the U.S., and the determined efforts made by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee soon after he came to power to steer his nation into the American orbit and out of the Indira Gandhi-led Soviet trajectory.

This is the second and perhaps the more subtle change of course in India's nationalistic foreign policy.

As India engages with the group, most hated in the Arab world, the central question then, is whether its enthusiasm for Israel will bring it more dividends long term than its current policy in the Middle East. Until now at least, it has pussyfooted around the Israelis while only mouthing platitudes in support of the Palestinians.

By inviting Sharon to Delhi - they have stalled a visit by the Israeli premier for three long years - is India prepared to risk losing the last shred of goodwill it has in the Arab world?

Insiders stress that in fact, the Sharon visit in no way dilutes India's support for a Palestinian homeland, and that it will have the opposite effect - it will help to build bridges with a country that can be wooed to help the Palestinians.

Critics have been quick to pour cold water on any such effect, saying that if the U.S. has been unable to contain Israel, it is unlikely that India will.

Clearly, India has chosen to put its own interests first. Just as it has pursued border talks with its huge Asian rival China to maintain the momentum on the disputed border issue, the Indian attempt to get the Israelis on board is expected to impact directly on the U.S.-India relationship. This has run aground on the cross-border issue and India's inability to extricate U.S. boffins from looking at India except through the India-Pakistan prism.

Insiders in government have also long expressed strong reservations over the inability of their Arab friends to treat the Kashmir dispute in a more equitable manner. Particularly galling they say is the latest draft resolution at a recent Organisation of Islamic Conference meet which makes no mention at all of the Vajpayee initiative for peace in the sub-continent. The only two Islamic countries that supported India at the meet were Syria and Indonesia.

This is an India that has come to the firm conclusion therefore that the road to Washington may indeed lie through Tel Aviv.

No lobby is as powerful as the Jewish in the U.S., and as any study of recent American history has demonstrated any U.S. president who has gone against the Jewish tide has not won a re-election.

Insiders also note that in the new unipolar world, where the U.S. has demonstrated its pre-eminence post-Iraq, the Jewish lever may be the only card India has left to play.

Neither trade and commerce or the attraction of India's huge middle class turning into a market for U.S. goods have made much of a difference.

Nor has the early Bush strategic vision of turning India into a counterweight to China held out with the rise of the 'neo-cons' who call the shots in the younger Bush administration.

Well aware of the perils of facing down a superpower, India is looking at the Israelis to strengthen their hand in tackling what India sees as patent U.S. double standards over arch rival and the US' staunch anti-terror ally, Pakistan and the continuing threat of "cross-border terrorism" that emanates from that country.

It has had to search for a new patois to keep the U.S. riveted. And while many see a relationship with Israel as choosing to sup with the devil, New Delhi is hoping that this is a conversation that will, for once, go their way.