The recent high-profile visit to Washington by the chief of Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), Lieutenant General Ehsanul Haq, reflects both the vital role of Intelligence in the "war on terror" as well as the key institutional linkage in the current "special relationship" between Pakistan and the United States.

Although intelligence agencies of the two countries have historically enjoyed a close bond, the current intimacy is of a qualitatively different character necessitated by events after September 11, 2001.

For instance, till the early 1960s, Pakistan's Intelligence Bureau used to have an "adviser" from the CIA. And visits of ISI chiefs to the U.S. are not new either.

In September 1999, DG ISI Lieutenant General Ziauddin was in Washington where a plan was apparently devised for a CIA-ISI joint operation to nab Osama bin Laden. And in September 2001, DG ISI Lieutenant General Mahmood Ahmed happened to be in Washington when the terror attacks took place in New York and the Pentagon, resulting in the U.S. "rediscovery" of its relationship with Pakistan.

Since 1954, when Pakistan formally joined the American camp at the height of the Cold War, the lynchpin of the relationship was that between the Pentagon and the Pakistan Army, with military hardware, role in U.S.-led pacts and the American base in Peshawar serving as its mainstay.

This relationship remained resilient, during the period of sanctions under the Pressler Amendment or even when civilian governments held office.

For instance, in May 1977, during the time of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, when the mass agitation to oust him was underway, the Chief of Army Staff General Zia-ul-Haq hosted a special dinner for the American Ambassador, which sent shock waves across the civilian establishment since the Foreign Office and the Prime Minister were kept out of the loop.

Six weeks later, when General Zia launched the July 5 coup, the U.S. endorsed it by maintaining silence over the demise of an elected civilian administration.

Similarly, in February 1992, when Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was in office, Chief of Army Staff General Asif Nawaz visited Washington where, according to The New York Times, he was feted "like a Head of State". In all three meetings with senior officials at the Pentagon and the State Department, he had one-on-one sessions, with the Ambassador politely excluded from the meetings.

Now in the changed international environment, it is apparent that, for the first time, the Intelligence connection seems to have superseded other institutional linkages in the context of Pakistan's American Connection.

This change is due to three key factors. First, U.S. strategy is now dependent on intelligence in major Muslim countries both to resolve contentious political issues as well as tracking terrorists.

For instance, in settling differences between Palestinian President Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas in the Palestinian Authority, the key role of an "honest broker" was played by the chief of Egyptian Intelligence, Omar Sulaiman, who shuttled between the two, finally sealing a deal that has the concurrence of both the Americans and the Israelis.

And the CIA has been entrusted with monitoring the implementation of the "roadmap" in Palestine, particularly issues relating to security and finance within the Palestine Authority.

Second, after the Iraq War, as terrorism in Riyadh and Casablanca has demonstrated, the Bush Administration, which earlier had been claiming that "the back of Al Qaida is broken", now has reversed that assessment.

Their focus on tracking terror has shifted again to Pakistan, making Intelligence cooperation pivotal. On May 17, The New York Times reported, citing "counter terrorism officials in Washington", that "Al Qaida is regrouping", claiming Pakistan and Chechnya are the terror group's "reorganised bases of operations".

On the same day, in his weekly radio address to the American people, President George W. Bush stated: "From Pakistan to the Philippines, to the Horn of Africa, we are hunting down Al Qaida killers."

In that hunt, the crucial connection is between the two countries' intelligence agencies, with the Americans already praising Pakistani cooperation in capturing over 500 of the 640 detainees at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba.

Third, the key goals in American strategy for Pakistan have made the Intelligence connection more robust. These goals include preventing war between India and Pakistan (pressuring India from undertaking any military action and promoting the path of a political settlement while asking Pakistan to close down "training camps in Azad Kashmir").

The other goal of tracking terrorists is evident from the capture of key Al Qaida operatives in which ISI cooperation was crucial.

Curbing religious extremism is another goal that the U.S. has set for Pakistan, and here too intelligence cooperation is vital.

The intelligence cooperation between Islamabad and Washington is currently the key element in the Pakistan-American relationship, implying U.S. trust and confidence in Pakistan's intelligence capabilities.

The Americans have already admitted their poor intelligence gathering capabilities in this region, a fact borne out by two different developments. In May 1998, the U.S. admitted to an intelligence failure in detecting the Indian nuclear tests. And after September 11, 2001, despite ousting the Taliban in Afghanistan, the U.S. is still clueless as to the whereabouts of Osama bin Laden, Mullah Omar or Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

Given this extraordinary U.S. dependence on Pakistan's cooperation to attain its goals in the "war on terror", Pakistan should also push for a quid pro quo with Washington on its vital interests. Take the case of declaring the Kashmiri armed group, Hizbul Mujahideen, as "terrorist" by the U.S. State Department.

The decision is unfair since the Hizb has never engaged in acts of violence against American citizens or property, and it is the one Kashmiri group with which India negotiated a ceasefire.

In fact, in July 2000, when Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee had a ceasefire with the Hizbul Mujahideen, he even stated his willingness to negotiate with them "within the framework of humanity".

Interestingly, although the U.S. declared Hezbollah as the "A-team of terrorists", the Lebanese government refused to declare them "terrorist" saying Hezbollah "is a legitimate resistance organisation", a formulation that Pakistan could also advocate for the Hizbul Mujahideen.

This new relationship between Pakistan and the United States also comes in an environment when pressure on Pakistan has lessened considerably.

Regarding relations with India, the clouds of war have receded, replaced by talk of peace and friendship, and the first steps towards normalisation of relations are already underway.

The U.S. with its hands full in Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine, and facing an extended terrorist threat, is no longer talking in terms of a Muslim "hit list" or "which country is next after Iraq". Washington has apparently realised, as the aftermath of the Iraq War has proven, that the "war on terror" has escalated since the root causes of terrorism remain to be addressed.